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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 12-3741
___________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
LAVAR BROWN,
Appellant
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Crim. No. 2:06-cr-00365-001)
District Judge: Honorable Anita B. Brody
____________________________________

Submitted for Possible Dismissal Due to a Jurisdictional Defect
or Possible Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
February 22, 2013
Before: AMBRO, SMITH and CHAGARES, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: March 8, 2013)
_________
OPINION
_________
PER CURIAM
LaVar Brown, a federal inmate proceeding pro se, appeals from an order of the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania denying his motion for
reconsideration of the denial of his motion for a new trial pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 33.

Because this appeal does not present a substantial question, we will summarily affirm the
District Court’s order. See 3d Cir. L.A.R 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.
I.
On September 29, 2009, a jury convicted Brown of conspiracy to commit armed bank
robbery; aiding and abetting armed bank robbery; aiding and abetting the carrying and use of a
firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence; and being a convicted felon in possession
of a firearm.1 The District Court subsequently sentenced Brown to a total of 300 months’
incarceration. This Court affirmed his judgment of conviction and sentence. See United States
v. Brown, 445 F. App’x 474 (3d Cir. Sept. 20, 2011).
In February 2012, Brown filed a motion pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 33, alleging newly
discovered evidence and requesting that the District Court dismiss all of the charges against
him, remove his career offender status, or grant him a new trial. He later filed a supplement to
his motion. On April 19, 2012, the District Court denied his motion because it restated his
previously litigated claims and failed to present any newly discovered evidence. Brown filed a
motion for reconsideration on May 8, 2012,2 which the District Court denied on August 28,
2012. Brown then filed this appeal.

1

Prior to trial, Brown filed a motion to suppress evidence and a motion to dismiss Counts One
through Three of the indictment, asserting that 18 U.S.C. § 2113 was an unconstitutional
exercise of Congress’ power to regulate interstate commerce. The District Court denied
Brown’s pretrial motions.
2
Brown dated his motion for reconsideration May 8, 2012; however, it was not docketed until
July 31, 2012. Under the “mailbox rule,” Brown’s motion is considered filed as of May 8,
2012. See Burns v. Morton, 134 F.3d 109, 113 (3d Cir. 1998).
2

II.
We must first determine the scope of this appeal. Under Fed. R. App. P. 4(b)(1)(A), a
defendant must file his notice of appeal “within 14 days . . . of the entry of either the judgment
or the order being appealed.” A motion for reconsideration can toll the time for taking an
appeal if filed within the period allotted for filing a notice of appeal. See United States v.
Christy, 3 F.3d 765, 767 n.1 (4th Cir. 1993); see also United States v. Vicaria, 963 F.2d 1412,
1413-14 (11th Cir. 1992) (per curiam) (noting that “the timely filing of such a motion in a
criminal action tolls the time for filing a notice of appeal and the time begins to run anew
following disposition of the motion”). The District Court’s order denying Brown’s motion for
a new trial was entered on April 19, 2012, but he did not file his motion for reconsideration
until May 8, 2012. Accordingly, Brown’s motion for reconsideration did not toll the period for
filing a notice of appeal. See United States v. Brewer, 60 F.3d 1142, 1144 (5th Cir. 1995).
However, the time limit for filing an appeal in a criminal case is not jurisdictional.
Virgin Islands v. Martinez, 620 F.3d 321, 328 (3d Cir. 2010). Here, the Government failed to
raise the issue and therefore waived it. Id. at 329; see also United States v. Muhammud, 701
F.3d 109, 11 (3d Cir. 2012). Because the delay in filing the motion was not inordinate, we
exercise our discretion to consider the appeal from both the underlying order denying his Fed.
R. Crim. P. 33 motion and the District Court’s July 31, 2012 order denying Brown’s
reconsideration motion. See United States v. Mitchell, 518 F.3d 740, 750 (10th Cir. 2008)
(noting that a court should not sua sponte raise the time bar in criminal cases “when judicial
resources and administration are not implicated and the delay has not been inordinate”).
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We exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Our review of the denial of a
motion for a new trial is for abuse of discretion, bearing in mind that such motions are not
favored and should be granted in exceptional cases only. See United States v. Silveus, 542
F.3d 993, 1005 (3d Cir. 2008) (citations omitted). A district court abuses its discretion when
“its decision rests upon a clearly erroneous finding of fact, an errant conclusion of law or an
improper application of law to fact.” United States v. Brown, 595 F.3d 498, 511 (3d Cir. 2010)
(quoting Montgomery v. Pinchak, 294 F.3d 492, 498 (3d Cir. 2002)). We also review the
denial of a motion for reconsideration for abuse of discretion. United States v. Dupree, 617
F.3d 724, 732 (3d Cir. 2010). The purpose of such a motion “is to correct a clear error of law
or to prevent a manifest injustice in the District Court’s original ruling.” Id.
III.
The test we apply to determine whether to grant a new trial based on newly discovered
evidence has five parts:
(a) the evidence must be[,] in fact, newly discovered, i.e., discovered since trial;
(b) facts must be alleged from which the court may infer diligence on the part of
the movant; (c) evidence relied on[] must not be merely cumulative or
impeaching; (d) it must be material to the issues involved; and (e) it must be
such, and of such nature, as that, on a new trial, the newly discovered evidence
would probably produce an acquittal.
United States v. Jasin, 280 F.3d 355, 361 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting United States v. Iannelli, 528
F.2d 1290, 1292 (3d Cir. 1976)). Evidence is not newly discovered if it was actually known or
could have been known by the diligence of the defendant or his counsel. United States v.
Cimera, 459 F.3d 452, 460 (3d Cir. 2006).
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After reviewing the record, we determine that the District Court did not abuse its
discretion in denying Brown’s motion for a new trial. We agree that Brown’s motion merely
restates his previously litigated claims and fails to present any newly discovered evidence.
While Brown cites case law decided after his conviction to support his arguments, case law is
not evidence that satisfies the requirements of Fed. R. Crim. P. 33. Similarly, the District
Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Brown’s motion for reconsideration, as it only
restated his arguments from his motion for a new trial.
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, no substantial question is presented and we will affirm the
judgment of the District Court. See 3d Cir. L.A.R 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.
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